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BANKING ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURAL
AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVING
NON-BANKING ACTIVITIES
JOHN L. DOUGLASt
INTRODUCTION
As banking organizations address the future, they find an in-
credible need to maximize the value of the customer relationship.
This leads to the exploration of additional products and services that
can be funneled through the existing distribution system, as well as
the exploration of alternative delivery systems that can more effi-
ciently and effectively deliver products and services.
As banks undertake this effort, the existing bank regulatory
structure does not easily resolve the issues presented. The difficulties
associated with the delivery of securities products have lasted for al-
most twenty years, and still have not been adequately addressed.
Bank insurance issues have been to the Supreme Court twice in the
last twenty-four months.
Everyone is talking about, and many are actually grappling with,
the issues associated with such relatively esoteric items as banking on
the Internet, smart cards, electronic cash, and digital signatures.
Banks and lawyers alike are attempting to apply statutory and regula-
tory principles to these new technologies, with decidedly uncertain
results. Lines that may have previously seemed bright in the past in
terms of permissible activities, disclosure requirements or possible
structures for specific activities appear not quite so bright today.
One of the critical issues in addressing new technologies arises
because of the need to involve non-bank participants in the effort to
deliver products and services. Either the non-bank is better able to
deliver the product in a specific way, or the non-bank has a particular
product that the bank wishes to run through the bank delivery sys-
tem. In either event, issues arise regarding permissibility: the extent
to which direct investment is permissible, structuring that investment,
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dealing with incidental impermissible activities, and so on predomi-
nate.
This outline is an attempt to provide a framework for addressing
many of the legal issues that arise from the combination of non-
banking providers with banking organizations. It begins with an ele-
mentary discussion of where specific types of activities may be placed
in the bank structure, then focuses more specifically on particular is-
sues arising with various types of combinations and arrangements.
I. NON-BANKING ACrIVITIES-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
While addressing bank structure has relatively mild complexities,
addressing the structuring on non-banking activities can be even
more daunting. The array of structural alternatives is vast, and the
regulatory framework can be incredibly complex. This portion of the
outline moves through the basic alternatives: in the bank or out of the
bank and in a holding company subsidiary or in a bank subsidiary.
The issues become more complex, and frankly, more interesting,
when the prospect of joint ownership is introduced. Accordingly, a
separate section is devoted to joint ventures and other structures with
bank and non-bank participants.
An introductory caution: in speaking of non-banking activities,
in general terms we are speaking of activities that are very closely
related to the business of banking. With two significant exceptions,
banking organizations are limited in their activities to those that are
financial in nature or which are integral parts of their operations.
The major exceptions are the subsidiaries of state chartered banks,
where state law may allow great flexibility in investments and activi-
ties (subject to the FDIC's oversight under Section 24 of the FDI
Act),' and the activities of unitary thrift holding companies which, so
long as their thrift subsidiaries meet the QTL test, may either directly
or through non-thrift subsidiaries engage in any activity without re-
striction.2
A. In the Bank or Outside the Bank
Virtually any activity in which a bank engages other than deposit
taking can be conducted outside the bank. Clearly, any activity
(other than deposit taking) that can be conducted in a bank may be
1. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994).
2. A discussion of the unitary thrift charter is not contained in this outline. This
outline is part of a much broader outline prepared by the author called "Structuring the
Bank," and is available on request.
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conducted in a subsidiary of that bank. Conversely, almost any ac-
tivity conducted by a bank holding company, bank holding company
subsidiary or bank subsidiary can be conducted within a bank. De-
termining whether or not to conduct an activity outside the bank,
then, generally depends not on the nature of the activity but other
factors.
1. Why an Activity Might Be Moved Outside the Bank
a. Location
Banks are restricted in the locations in which they operate. Ac-
cordingly, if an activity must be conducted at a location other than a
place where a bank may branch or establish a facility, consideration
must be given as to whether the activity might constitute impermissi-
ble branching, and thus to moving the activity outside the bank.
b. Licensing
Certain activities require special licenses or approvals, and may
subject the entity to examination or supervision. For instance, insur-
ance agency operations, or credit life underwriting, may be licensed
and supervised by the state insurance commissioner. Banks may re-
sist opening the institution to supervision or regulation by a party
other than the bank regulator, and may wish to house these opera-
tions in separate corporate entities.
c. Potential Liabilities
Certain activities may expose the bank to unacceptable risks,
even though they could be conducted within the bank. Common ex-
amples are real estate holdings, which may include not only
foreclosed properties but the bank's own facilities. Claims that result
from the ownership or operation of properties or other businesses
outside the scope of the bank's core business may be moved outside
the bank to protect the institution.
d. Tax Considerations
Certain activities are better conducted outside the bank for tax
purposes. For instance, certain states grant favorable tax treatment
to "wholesale" institutions. Others provide special incentives for
captive insurance operations, credit card operations, data processing,
or other types of activities.
1997]
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e. Marketplace and Positioning
While there may be little validity to the perception, on occasion
certain activities perhaps should best be conducted outside the bank
because of fear of being tainted by the general reputation of banks in
certain areas. For example, many banks are conducting investment
advisory activities outside the bank's trust department for fear that
the stodgy reputation of trust departments may interfere with at-
tracting funds from wealthy clients.
f. Management and Personnel Issues
Certain activities may be best conducted outside the traditional
bank hierarchy so as to not interfere with the more entrepreneurial
nature of certain activities. Compensation concerns may result in
shifting highly commissioned salespeople out of the bank in order to
avoid jealousies or salary complaints.
g. Need to Involve Third Parties as Participants in an Activity
On many occasions the success of a particular venture or activity
depends on the successful involvement of third parties that may re-
quire equity interests in the venture. It may be difficult to structure
such participation within the bank, or the venture may create certain
liabilities or risks as described above. Creating a separate entity can
facilitate both the equity participation of the third party and poten-
tially lessen liability or other risks.
h. Regulatory Pressure
On occasion the regulators prefer that activities be conducted
outside the bank based primarily upon their perceptions of risk and
propriety.
2. Keeping an Activity in the Bank
One of the primary reasons activities are moved outside a bank
is because if the activity were conducted in the bank, the office at
which the activity is conducted would be considered a branch. Even
with the expanded branching authority contained in Riegle-Neal,
banks do not have unlimited authority to conduct their activities na-
tionwide.3 The issue is whether conducting the activity in an office
transforms that office into a branch.
3. See Sections 102 and 103 of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act.
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The definition of a branch may vary. The traditional definition
is that a branch is an office owned or leased by a bank at which de-
posits are accepted or loans approved.4 As the acceptance of deposits
is the essence of a bank, and probably constitutes "conducting a
banking business" under the laws of most jurisdictions, it is extremely
unlikely that deposit taking activities could be conducted from a loca-
tion that is not a bank branch.' On the other hand, lending activities
can often be structured so that no impermissible banking activities
are conducted at the office.
The OCC has given substantial guidance on when an office be-
comes a branch. Under its loan production office (LPO) rulings, an
office may solicit loans, accept applications, and otherwise assist in
the closing of a loan so long as it does not either approve the loan or
actually close the loan and disburse proceeds.6 With advances in
technology, transmitting completed loan packages to a bank branch
for final approval is only a slight inconvenience, and unless the funds
need to be delivered personally to the customer at the office, using
mail, wire transfers, or the offices of a third party can accomplish the
desired result.
Similarly, the OCC has ruled that an office that is not accessible
to the public, and thus provides no competitive advantage, is not a
branch.7 Accordingly, a back office might be set up to support non-
banking activities that could facilitate the activities and still not con-
stitute a branch. An example might be a processing center, where
applications are received, analyzed and approved, and which could
coordinate loan closings and the like.
State laws need to be consulted. Most states have prohibitions
on conducting a banking business. Those prohibitions may key on
things other than merely accepting deposits or approving loans.
States often have representative office, loan production, or deposit
production statutes. A national bank might be able to ignore certain
of these statutes on the grounds of preemption, however, a state bank
would not.
4. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.30(b) (1996).
5. See generally O.C.G.A. 7-1-590; 12 U.S.C. § 1864(0 (1994).
6. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310 (1996); see also Banking Circular 199.
7. See OCC Interpretive Letter 343 (1985). The OCC position on these issues is
summarized in its proposed revisions to its Part 5 Regulations (12 C.F.R. Part 5) govern-
ing corporate activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61034, Nov. 29, 1994.
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B. In a Bank Subsidiary or a Bank Holding Company Subsidiary
Once the decision is made to move an activity outside the bank,
there are two basic choices: (1) the activity will be placed below the
bank, in a bank subsidiary, or (2) it will be placed in a bank holding
company subsidiary. If the activity is to be housed in a bank subsidi-
ary, it can either be in a bank operating subsidiary or a bank service
corporation subsidiary.
1. The Bank Holding Company Subsidiary
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended8 (the
BHCA), grants the Federal Reserve Board the authority to supervise
and regulate the activities of bank holding companies and their sub-
sidiaries. Importantly, the BHCA imposes strict limits on the ability
of a bank holding company to engage in activities, either directly or
through a subsidiary, by limiting the activities of a bank holding com-
pany to those of banking, or of managing or controlling banks, or so
closely related to the business of banking or of managing or control-
ling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.9
In order to establish or acquire a non-bank subsidiary, a bank
holding company must comply with the requirements of the BHCA
as implemented by the Federal Reserve in its Regulation Y. The ac-
tivity must either be one of the statutory or regulatory activities
already deemed by the Federal Reserve to be permissible, or the ap-
plicant must obtain a specific determination of permissibility from
the Federal Reserve.
Certain types of activities may be undertaken without notice to
or approval from the Federal Reserve. These activities include per-
forming services for the bank holding company or its affiliates,
engaging in the safe deposit business, fiduciary investments, securities
eligible for investment by a national bank, securities representing less
than 5% of the shares of any company, shares of an investment com-
pany that does not own more than 5% of the outstanding shares of
any company, and certain acquisitions to engage in activities for
which approval has already been obtained.
Regulation Y contains a list of additional permissible activities.
For the listed activities, prior notice must be given to the Federal Re-
serve and approval must be obtained prior to commencing the
activity or acquiring an entity engaged in the activity. There are ex-
8. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1994).
9. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1994).
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pedited procedures for small acquisitions."°
Importantly, the Federal Reserve has proposed revisions to its
Regulation Y governing non-banking activities of bank holding com-
panies. The proposal, published for comment in September 1996,
would substantially streamline the approval process, particularly for
well capitalized institutions. These proposed revisions were affected
by sections of the regulatory relief provisions contained in the 1996
budget legislation, providing similar relief for well capitalized, well
managed institutions engaging in small acquisitions.
2. The Bank Operating Subsidiary
Both the Comptroller of the Currency and every state regulator
will permit a bank to establish an operating subsidiary. An operating
subsidiary is a subsidiary of the bank established to engage in activi-
ties which the bank itself could engage in directly. The decision to
engage in bank-permissible activities through subsidiaries is viewed
as a corporate and strategic decision. While banks do conduct a wide
variety of fairly mundane activities through operating subsidiaries,
they have become the vehicles for some of the most interesting de-
velopments in the expansion of products and services, particularly
joint activities with non-bank entities.
Establishing an operating subsidiary generally requires the ap-
proval of the bank's chartering authority, either the OCC for national
banks or the state for state banks. There is no separate approval re-
quired from the Federal Reserve or the FDIC for a state bank to
establish an operating subsidiary.
The OCC has recently revised its rules for establishing operating
subsidiaries in part 5 of its regulations. The regulation previously
required that the parent bank own at least 80% of the voting stock of
the subsidiary. That requirement has been reduced to 50%. The re-
vision provides that certain types of activities may be conducted in
subsidiaries without the need for any notice to the OCC. An after
the fact notice is sufficient for well capitalized, well managed institu-
tions. Other banks must generally go through a notice or approval
process, and this process will be applied to all banks with respect to
certain types of activities. The OCC may condition its approval of an
operating subsidiary."
10. For a more complete list of permissible activities, see infra notes 18-41 and ac-
companying text.
11. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1996).
19971
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No notice or approval from the OCC is required for an operating
subsidiary if the activities are limited to those previously approved
for an operating subsidiary of the bank, those activities continue to
be legally permissible, and the activities are conducted in accordance
with any previously imposed conditions.
The OCC's regulations generally require that the operating sub-
sidiary must limit its activities to those permissible for the bank, and
will be subject to the same examination and supervision as the parent
bank. The revised regulations hold out the possibility that an oper-
ating subsidiary might not need to limit its activities precisely to those
permissible for the bank, and indicate that the subsidiary need not
necessarily be supervised and examined as a bank. Various orders of
the OCC indicate that compliance even with the 50% requirement is
not mandatory, and that various ventures are permissible through
operating subsidiaries which, while not impermissible for a bank to
engage in, are in practical terms unlikely to be subject to bank-like
supervision and regulation.
The OCC's regulations speak in terms of subsidiary corpora-
tions. The OCC has approved a bank's participation in an operating
subsidiary structured as a limited liability company, and has allowed
a bank to be a limited partner in a partnership. The OCC cannot ap-
prove a bank becoming a general partner of a partnership, due to
concerns relating to the unlimited liability of a partner, 12 but the OCC
has allowed a bank to establish a corporate subsidiary to serve as the
general partner of a partnership.
Depending upon the activity, the OCC may impose limitations
on a bank's investment in an operating subsidiary. Such limitations
are typically imposed when the bank is engaging in activities per-
ceived to be risky or where there is substantial participation by non-
affiliated entities. "Investment" includes both the direct equity in-
vestment in the operating subsidiary, as well as any loans or
extensions of credit to or for the benefit of the subsidiary. The com-
mon limitation is 5% of assets.
3. The Bank Service Corporation
Banks may also invest in bank service corporations, authorized
by the Bank Service Corporation Act.'3 A bank service corporation
may only have insured banks as shareholders. It is a useful vehicle
for a bank which is not a subsidiary of a bank holding company to
12. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Wehrman, 202 U.S. 295 (1906).
13. See 12 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
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invest in non-banking activities, or for affiliated or non-affiliated
banks to join together in various ventures.
There are three types of bank service corporations. The first is
the true service corporation, one that only engages in back office
services such as check and deposit sorting and other clerical, book-
keeping, accounting, or similar functions for other financial
institutions. A bank may establish such a subsidiary without prior
notice or approval.'
4
The second type of service corporation is little different than an
operating subsidiary. A bank may establish a service corporation to
engage in activities permissible for its parent bank (or banks), so long
as it engages only in activities permissible for its parent(s) at loca-
tions where its parent(s) could perform such services. In order to
invest in such a service corporation, the bank must receive the ap-
proval of its primary federal regulator. 5
The third type of bank service corporation may engage in any ac-
tivity the Federal Reserve Board has determined to be permissible
for a bank holding company (other than deposit taking), and may do
so at any geographic location. In order to invest in such a service
corporation, the bank must receive the prior approval of the Federal
Reserve. 6
A bank may not invest more than 10% of its capital in a bank
service corporation, and may not invest more than 5% of its assets in
all service corporations. As with the operating subsidiary, "invest"
includes both equity investments and extensions of credit. 7
Because the powers of a bank are not substantially different
from the permissible powers of a bank holding company, there are
relatively rare occasions when a bank service corporation will be re-
quired. It does, however, have some attractiveness in unique
situations.
4. Comparison of Powers
There is no major difference in the powers that may be con-
ducted through a bank holding company subsidiary and a bank
subsidiary. The Federal Reserve is the arbiter of the Bank Holding
Company Act" (the BHCA), which defines permissible bank holding
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 1863 (1994).
15. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1864 (c)-(e) and § 1865(a) (1994).
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 1864(0 and § 1865(b) (1994).
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(6) (1994).
18. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1994).
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company powers, and through statute, regulation, and order, the list
of activities is extensive. For the sake of simplicity, this portion of
the outline will address only the BHCA-permissible powers. The
OCC list of permissible powers and activities is virtually identical.
a. The Statutory List
The BHCA provides that a bank holding company may not own
voting shares of any company, with the following significant excep-
tions:
shares of a company engaged solely in holding or operating
properties used by a bank subsidiary, in conducting a safe deposit
business or furnishing or performing services for the bank holding
company or its subsidiaries;19 shares of a company acquired in satis-
faction of a debt previously contracted in good faith, subject to
certain limitations relating to how long the shares may be held;2
shares held in a fiduciary capacity;21 shares of the kinds and amount
eligible for investment by national banks;' shares which do not repre-
sent more than 5% of the voting shares of the company;23 shares of
any company which the Federal Reserve Board determines are en-
gaged in activities so closely related to the business of banking or of
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto;24
shares of a company which conducts no business in the United States
except as an incident to its international or foreign business if the
Board determines that the exemption would not be in variance with
the purposes of the BHCA and be in the public interest; 2' shares of
an export trading company, subject to certain limitations. 6
b. The Regulatory List
The Federal Reserve has by regulation set forth those non-
banking activities which it is prepared to approve on a routine basis.
The list, contained in section 225.25 of title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations is long and detailed, but there are many significant
authorities. These authorities include making and servicing loans,
including consumer finance, credit card, mortgage, commercial fi-
19. See § 4(c)(1).
20. See § 4(c)(2).
21. See § 4(c)(4).
22. See § 4(c)(5).
23. See § 4(c)(6).
24. See § 4(c)(8).
25. See § 4(c)(13).
26. See § 4(c)(14).
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nance or factoring;27 operating an industrial bank or industrial loan
company;' performing trust company functions;2 or acting as an in-
vestment or financial advisor.3 In addition, these authorities include
engaging in certain leasing activities of real or personal property,
subject to limitations designed to assure that the leasing is roughly
equivalent to financing;" engaging in data processing activities that
are financial, banking or economic, and in connection therewith, pro-
viding hardware subject to limitations;32 engaging in credit life and
equivalent insurance underwriting, insurance agency activities in
towns of less than 5,000 (although unlike the OCC, the Federal Re-
serve limits the agency activities to residents of the small town), and
certain other limited insurance activities;3 3 operating a savings asso-
ciation,' providing courier services,' management consulting to
depository institutions,36 or selling money orders, savings bonds or
travelers checks;37 providing real and personal property appraisal
services and arranging real estate equity financing,38 although real
estate brokerage is not permitted; engaging in a wide variety of secu-
rities activities, including brokerage, underwriting and dealing in
government obligations and money market instruments, providing
foreign exchange advisory and transactional services, serving as a fu-
tures commission merchant, and providing investment advice on
financial futures and options;39 providing consumer credit counseling,
engaging in tax planning and preparation, providing check guarantee
services, or operating a collection agency or a credit bureau."
The Federal Reserve has proposed revisions to Regulation Y
that would update and modernize the provisions, bringing them into
general conformity with past orders and current board thinking. Im-
portant procedural revisions are contemplated, including granting the
Board authority to add new activities to the list on its own initiative,
27. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(1) (1996).
28. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(2) (1996).
29. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(3) (1996).
30. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(4) (1996).
31. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(5) (1996).
32. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(7) (1996).
33. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(8) (1996).
34. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(9) (1996).
35. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(10) (1996).
36. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(11) (1996).
37. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(12) (1996).
38. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(13)-(14) (1996).
39. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(15)-(19) (1996).
40. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(20)-(24) (1996).
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creating a less formal process where an institution could obtain rul-
ings on the permissibility of additional activities, and adding greater
flexibility particularly in the management consulting and data proc-
essing areas.
c. The Order List
There is no easily accessible list of powers approved by the Fed-
eral Reserve under its discretionary authority. In each instance, the
approvals have been for activities that are "so closely related to the
business of banking or of managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto. '' 4' The majority are simply modest exten-
sions of the listed powers rather than groundbreaking new activities.
The major exceptions are the securities underwriting powers of the
so-called "Section 20" subsidiaries.
Under Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act, banks may not af-
filiate with entities that are principally engaged in underwriting or
distributing securities impermissible for national banks. The Federal
Reserve has interpreted this provision by stating that a company oth-
erwise engaged in the securities business is not principally engaged in
impermissible activities so long as its underwriting and distribution of
the bank ineligible securities does not amount to more than 10% of
its total securities revenues.
All of the Section 20 authorities have been granted by order of
the Board, each with substantial conditions attached to protect the
holding company and any affiliated bank from dangers that might
result from the securities activities.
5. Regulatory Jurisdiction
In simple terms, where an activity is placed in the structure will
determine who regulates the activity. If the activity is conducted in
the bank or a bank subsidiary, the bank's regulator regulates. If the
activity is conducted in a bank holding company subsidiary, the Fed-
eral Reserve regulates. Moving the activity outside the bank may
require registration, and thus supervision and regulation, by other
regulatory bodies other than the bank regulators. For example, a se-
curities brokerage activity conducted outside the bank will require
registrations with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
National Association of Securities Dealers, and supervision by those
bodies, while maintaining those activities within the bank avoids such
requirements.
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
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The Federal Reserve's Regulation Y states that a bank subsidi-
ary of a bank holding company must comply with the Regulation Y
requirements if an activity is conducted in a subsidiary that is not
wholly owned or whose activities are not limited to those permissible
for the bank itself.42 This assertion of jurisdiction appears inconsis-
tent with the regulatory structure itself, which would leave regulation
of the bank and its activities, either directly or through subsidiaries,
to the bank's regulators, while leaving regulation of the bank holding
company and its activities, either directly or through non-bank sub-
sidiaries, to the Federal Reserve.
In Citicorp v. Board of Governors,43 the issue was squarely
joined. Delaware had adopted a law which provided state banks with
the authority to underwrite and broker insurance, provided the ac-
tivities were either conducted in a separate division of the bank or in
a bank subsidiary. The law contained elaborate provisions (regarding
the requirements to engage in insurance activities), designed to sepa-
rate the banking and insurance activities and assure that neither
would be adversely affected if either ran into difficulties.
The Federal Reserve challenged the activity, on the basis that its
jurisdiction extended to non-bank subsidiaries of banks whenever the
subsidiary was engaging in an activity impermissible for the bank to
engage in. The Board believed that this was an evasion of its jurisdic-
tion, and sought to stop this type of state action.
The Second Circuit reviewed the relevant provisions of the
BHCA and other statutes governing the supervision of banks and
bank holding companies, and determined that the appropriate juris-
dictions of the regulators would be as follows: whoever regulates the
bank will regulate subsidiaries of the bank. Therefore, since the Fed-
eral Reserve regulates bank holding companies and non-bank
subsidiaries of bank holding companies. The court determined that
this allocation of responsibilities was rational, avoided conflicts and
comported with reasonable expectations of the parties.
While the Federal Reserve has not amended its Regulation Y to
comport with the Citicorp decision, we are unaware of the Federal
Reserve attempting to challenge a bank or bank subsidiary on the
basis of the Regulation Y provision following the Citicorp ruling.
42. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2) (1996).
43. 935 F.2d 66 (2d Cir, 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Independent Ins. Agents of
Ame. v. Citicorp, 502 U.S. 1031 (1992).
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6. Funding and Sections 23A and B
Selecting whether to place an activity in a bank subsidiary or a
bank holding company subsidiary results in a major difference in how
the activity may be funded. If a bank subsidiary is used, the bank
may fund the activity directly, subject only to limitations as to the ag-
gregate investment in the subsidiary. If a bank holding company
subsidiary is used, the bank's ability to fund the affiliate will be con-
strained by Sections 23A and B of the Federal Reserve Act.
Sections 23A and B of the Federal Reserve Act,. impose strin-
gent limits on the ability of a bank to engage in "covered
transactions" with its "affiliates." An affiliate is any entity that con-
trols the bank or is under common control with the bank. A bank
holding company is an affiliate of its subsidiary bank, as are most
non-bank subsidiaries of a bank holding company. A subsidiary of
the bank, however, is not an affiliate of the bank, nor is another bank
subsidiary of the parent bank holding company. Accordingly, a bank
may engage in transactions with its own subsidiaries or with sister
bank subsidiaries of its parent bank holding company free of the re-
strictions of Section 23A.
A covered transaction is an extension of credit to the affiliate,
the purchase or investment in securities issued by the affiliate, the
purchase of assets from the affiliate, the acceptance of securities is-
sued by the affiliate as collateral for a loan or extension of credit to
any person or company, or the issuance of a guarantee, acceptance or
letter of credit on behalf of the affiliate. 5
Section 23A imposes a limit on transactions with an affiliate of
10% of the bank's capital and surplus, and an aggregate limit on
transactions with all affiliates of 20% of the bank's capital and sur-
plus.'
Any loan or extension of credit to, or guarantee or letter of
credit issued on behalf of, an affiliate must be secured by government
securities, or a segregated deposit or equivalent equal to 100% of the
exposure, or obligations of a state or political subdivision equal to
110% of the exposure, or other debt instruments, including receiv-
ables, equal to 120% of the exposure, or stock, leases, or other real or
personal property equal to 130% of the exposure. Low quality assets
are not eligible for collateral, nor are securities issued by an affiliate.47
44. Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c.
45. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7) (1994).
46. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a) (1994).
47. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(c) (1994).
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Any transaction with an affiliate must be on terms and condi-
tions that are consistent with safe and sound banking practices, and
must be on terms and conditions that are substantially the same as, or
at least as favorable to the bank, as those prevailing for non-affiliated
transactions.
Both the absolute limits on the amount of credit that may be ex-
tended to an affiliate and the collateralization requirements mean
that the bank may not be the best source of funding for the opera-
tions of the affiliate. Accordingly, for bank holding company
subsidiaries, in addition to limited funding from an affiliated bank,
the subsidiary must look to the holding company or other third par-
ties for funds. And while there are limits on the ability of a bank to
fund its own subsidiaries (many imposed by order, not statute), there
are no collateral requirements, and thus much greater ease of fund-
ing.
7. Differences in Application/Notice/Approval Procedures
In selecting a location for a particular activity in a banking or-
ganization, there are certain differences in the approval process.
These differences are relatively slight; however, in certain circum-
stances, these slight differences may be critical.
a. The Bank Holding Company Subsidiary
Under Regulation Y, a bank holding company that wishes to
commence de novo an activity listed as permissible in Regulation Y
must provide the Federal Reserve Bank with a notice detailing the
activities, the identity of the company that will conduct the activities,
and if done through a subsidiary, the identity of the subsidiary. For
acquisitions of existing companies, the notice must also provide cer-
tain financial, competitive and expected public benefits information.
Public notice and a comment period are provided. The Reserve
Bank has thirty days after receipt of a completed notice to approve
the request or to defer it to Washington for Board action. If sent to
Washington, the Board attempts to act within sixty days of initial
submission of the notice."
For unlisted activities, the procedure is similar, although the no-
tice must also contain an analysis of why the activity is so closely
related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto. The company
must also commit to comply with all conditions or limitations previ-
48. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(4) (1994).
49. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.23(d)(2) (1995).
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ously imposed by the Board in connection with the activity. In all
such cases, the final approval will come from the Reserve Board in
Washington, rather than through one of the Reserve Banks.
The Board has an expedited notice procedure for acquisitions of
small businesses where the book value or acquisition costs do not ex-
ceed the greater of $15 million or 5% of the consolidated assets of
the acquirer, up to a maximum of $300 million. If the activity is listed
in Section 4(c)(8), the applicant has previously received Board ap-
proval for the activity, and the applicant meets all required capital
levels, the public comment period is shortened to ten days and the
Reserve Bank is to act within fifteen days."0
For acquisitions of companies engaged in making, acquiring or
servicing consumer loans, no application is required if the acquirer
has already received approval to engage in the activity in the area
served, the assets acquired during any twelve month period do not
exceed the lesser of $25 million or 25% of consolidated assets, no
more than 50% of the acquirer's assets are devoted to the activity
and the acquirer meets capital adequacy guidelines. Notice within
thirty days following the acquisition is required."
b. Bank Operating Subsidiaries
The procedure for establishing a bank operating subsidiary is
somewhat similar. For a national bank, the bank must notify the
OCC for the district in which it is located, providing information re-
garding the activity, the location, and relevant financial information.
Unless otherwise notified, the bank may commence the activity fol-
lowing the expiration of the thirty-day period. 2
If the activities of an operating subsidiary are limited to activities
previously allowed by the OCC for that bank, they continue to be
permissible, and will be operated in accordance with any previously
imposed conditions applicable to the bank, no prior notification is
required. 3
c. Bank Service Corporation
Each regulatory agency has its own procedures for obtaining ap-
proval for a bank operating subsidiary. The OCC requires a letter
50. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.23(e) (1995).
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(c)(8) (1995).
52. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (1996).
53. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1)(iv) (1995).
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application to the district office, with basic financial and related data
demonstrating, among other things, compliance with the limitations
and requirements of the Bank Service Corporation Act. The OCC
may require certain applicants to provide information relating to fi-
nancial, managerial, or other supervisory concerns. In general, the
OCC will render a decision on completed applications within ninety
days of submission.o
8. Activities Required To Be in a BHC Subsidiary
While the lists of activities that may be conducted in either a
bank subsidiary or a bank holding company subsidiary are virtually
identical, there are some exceptions.
a. Equity Interests of Less than 5%
Banks generally are not permitted to make equity investments.
Under Section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA, a bank holding company may
own shares of any company which do not represent more than 5% of
the outstanding voting shares of the company.5 These less than 5%
investments must be passive in nature, and cannot be combined with
other interests in the company so as to give the bank holding com-
pany the power to elect a majority of the board of directors or
otherwise exert a controlling influence over the management or poli-
cies of the company. With these exceptions, however, a bank holding
company or subsidiary may own minority interests in any entity, in
either voting (less than 5% of the class) or non-voting (less than 25%
of the total equity) shares. Banks generally cannot own equity inter-
ests.
One alternative in this area is the small business investment
company (SBIC), a permissible investment for both national banks
and bank holding companies.56 SBICs, in turn, may hold non-
controlling (i.e., less than 50%) equity investments in small busi-
nesses. A variation of the SBIC is the MESBIC, the minority
enterprise small business investment corporation, providing a vehicle
for investing in small minority and women-owned businesses.
b. Certain Securities Activities
The Glass-Steagall Act prohibits a bank from engaging in certain
securities activities. However, a member bank may affiliate with a
54. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.35(e)(2) (1996).
55. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1994); see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.111 (1995).
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firm that is not principally engaged in impermissible securities activi-
ties. As discussed above, this so-called Section 20 power allows a
bank holding company to create a subsidiary to engage to a limited
extent, in underwriting and dealing in bank ineligible securities,
something that would not be permitted for either a Federal Reserve
member bank (which would include a national bank) or for a subsidi-
ary of a member bank.
The Federal Reserve, in carrying out its supervisory function of
bank holding companies, will strongly discourage a state bank sub-
sidiary of a bank holding company from engaging in securities
activities outside the bounds of those permitted bank holding com-
pany subsidiaries, even if permitted under state law. While the
Federal Reserve lacks the authority to enforce such a prohibition, its
position as regulator provides strong incentive for a bank to cooper-
ate.
On the other hand, the prohibitions of Section 20 of the Glass-
Steagall Act does not reach non-member banks. Accordingly, those
state banks that are not part of a holding company system or other-
wise affiliated with national banks may permissibly establish
securities subsidiaries to the full extent permitted by state law.
II. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN NON-BANKING AcrIvrniEs
The preceding section addressed the various considerations af-
fecting the structural choices with respect to non-banking activities.
This section will address particular, peculiar issues associated with
those activities.
A. Joint Ventures
Often with respect to non-banking activities, there is a compel-
ling need to involve another participant. That need may result from
lack of expertise or management skills, need for capital, increased
geographic breadth, or special marketing or positioning considera-
tions. Often joint ventures are undertaken to limit risks, to allow
participants to pool resources to enter new endeavors, but without
necessarily exposing one single entity to the entire risk of loss if the
endeavor fails.
Regardless of the nature of the other participants, the activity
may be housed in either a bank or bank holding company subsidiary.
As a general rule, joint venture-type activity may not be conducted
directly in the bank, as the regulatory authorities frown on exposing
the bank to potential liabilities resulting from these ventures.
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1. The BHC Subsidiary and Joint Ventures
Of all the possible structures, the bank holding company subsidi-
ary is perhaps the easiest to accommodate to the joint venture.
Under Section 4 of the BHCA, the Federal Reserve is required to
approve voting investments of greater than 5% in any entity; the
clear implication is that the investment need not be a majority or con-
trolling investment.' Indeed, the Federal Reserve Orders dealing
with participating in activities with other entities regularly involve
less than majority positions.
The Federal Reserve does require that the venture limit its ac-
tivities to those permissible for bank holding companies and their
subsidiaries. It reserves the right to examine the activities of the ven-
ture, and will in fact do so on a routine basis.
The Federal Reserve has approved ventures involving multiple
participants structured as partnerships, limited partnerships, corpora-
tions or joint ventures under state law.
The Board has a series of concerns with respect to joint ventures
that have been reflected in its orders over time. These concerns in-
clude the following:
The Board wants to be sure that participants in a venture other-
wise engaged in impermissible activities do not use the venture to
allow the bank holding company to engage in the impermissible ac-
tivities. Accordingly, the Board will often impose a series of
commitments designed to assure that the venture will be kept sepa-
rate from the activities of the other participants. Such conditions are
common in joint ventures with securities firms, for instance, where
specific types of management interlocks may be prohibited, joint em-
ployees may be restricted, or physical separation of offices may be
required. The Board may require a commitment on the part of the
bank holding company to divest its interest in the venture on request
of the Board.
When a non-bank venturer has control over the venture, the
Board has two concerns. First, the Board believes that it has the right
to supervise and examine all non-bank subsidiaries of a bank holding
company. Such supervision may be seen as intrusive by non-
regulated entities. Second, the Board wants to assure that the ven-
ture continues to engage only in permissible activities.
The Board is occasionally concerned where the participants in
joint ventures are very large or the activities are to be extensive, that
57. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6).
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the venture may result in an undue concentration of resources. In
Deutsche Bank/Fiat Credit," such a joint venture was disapproved,
even though the venture was strictly limited to otherwise permissible
activities. On the other hand, the Board recently approved a joint
venture between Wells Fargo and Nikko Securities in 1990,"9 relating
to trust and investment management services, and in 1983 approved a
joint venture between Citicorp and Harrison Credit Corp.,' a large
company engaged in the manufacture of farm equipment.
The Board has on occasion determined that a bank holding
company should limit its exposure in a joint venture, and has disap-
proved certain ventures where it has determined that the investment
in a single venture or group of ventures is too great.61
Notwithstanding the concerns that have been expressed in vari-
ous orders, the Board has routinely approved joint ventures in
virtually every area: data processing, trust activities, investment advi-
sory services, mortgage banking, financing and leasing activities,
ATM services, travelers checks, municipal securities brokerage, mer-
chant credit card processing, and holding real property obtained
through or in lieu of foreclosure. 62
The Federal Reserve in the past required responses to a specific
set of questions if a 4(c)(8) application involves a joint venture. The
questions reflected many of the concerns expressed above. For ex-
ample, the applicant was required to describe whether the parties
could each engage in the application independently and indicate why
the joint venture was being formed. The applicant was required to
state the actions to be taken to inform customers that they were not
required to take services offered by the joint venture. Certain ques-
tions addressed the issue of control, and required the applicant to
indicate willingness to divest the interest in the venture the non-
banking organization obtains control and the venture commences
impermissible activities. Those general questions have been elimi-
nated, although applicants seeking to form joint ventures should be
prepared to address many of these concerns as part of the application
58. See James McAfee, Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt, Germany, 67 FED. RESERVE
BULL. No. 5 449 (1981).
59. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Wells Fargo & Co., San Fransico, California, 76 FED.
RESERVE BULL. No. 6 465 (June 1990).
60. See James McAfee, Citicorp., New York, New York, 69 FED. RESERVE BULL.
No. 8 648 (Aug. 1983).
61. Maryland National Corp./General Electric Credit Corp. (1979).
62. See PAULINE B. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW, 5.03[7]
(Law Journals Seminar-Press) (1986).
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process.
2. Bank Operating Subsidiaries
The bank operating subsidiary, in spite of the apparent restric-
tions that appear from the OCC's operating subsidiary regulations, is
an extraordinarily useful vehicle for structuring arrangements with
non-bank providers. As noted above, the regulations appear to re-
quire that a bank own not less than 50% of the subsidiary, it appears
that no such limitation is recognized in actual practice. The OCC has
for several years approved a variety of subsidiary ventures where the
actual ownership in the operating entity was much less than 50%.
The OCC has developed over the past two years reasonably
straightforward ground rules for joint venture-type investments by
banks. OCC precedents squarely demonstrate that the percentage
ownership held by banks in the underlying venture is not relevant to
the determination of permissibility. The OCC has approved a num-
ber of arrangements in the past through operating subsidiaries where
the operating subsidiary's participation in a joint venture, partnership
or corporation was less than 50%.63 The principal determination of
permissibility relates to the nature of the activity itself. So long as
the enterprise conforms its activities to those permissible to national
banks, the banks retain the ability to prohibit impermissible activi-
ties, the OCC retains the supervisory power to examine the venture,
the investment relates to the bank's ongoing business, and the bank
does not become liable for the debts or obligations of the venture, the
percentage ownership is immaterial.
The determining criteria are: first, whether the activity is permis-
sible; second, whether the bank can limit the activities of the venture
to those permissible for national banks; third, whether the bank's li-
ability is limited from both an accounting and a legal perspective; and
fourth, whether the investment is convenient or useful to the bank in
carrying out its business, and not merely a passive investment unre-
lated to that bank's banking business.
Over the years, the OCC has permitted banks to form operating
63. See, e.g., Letter No. 381, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,605 (May 5, 1987) (33
1/3% interest as general partner); Interpretive Letter No. 516, Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,220 (July 12, 1990) (17% interest as general partner with four other part-
ners); Interpretive Letter No. 517, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,228 (Aug. 16, 1990)
(17% interest as general partner of one partnership, 17% interest as limited partner in
another partnership); Letter of Stephen R. Steinbrink, Deputy Chief Comptroller, Nov.
15, 1995 (25% shareholder interest in trust company); Interpretive Letter NO. 689, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (Aug. 9,1995) (60% interest in LLC).
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subsidiaries to engage in and carry out permissible activities. As long
as the ownership is incidental to the banking business of the bank,
and not a "speculative" investment of the bank, the prohibitions of
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act contained in section 24(Seventh)
of title 12 of the United States Code relating to stock ownership sim-
ply do not apply. This view is consistent with an interpretive ruling of
the OCC issued in 1966, declaring that Section 16 was not intended to
prohibit, and did not impair, the ability of national banks to "acquire
and hold stock in corporations as an incident to and to facilitate the
banks' conduct of their banking business.""' This analysis applies to
minority stock purchases just as it applies to wholly owned operating
subsidiaries. We note that in that same year, the OCC permitted a
bank to acquire a minority interest in a credit card clearinghouse
owned by a number of institutions."
The Comptroller has authorized similar arrangements for a wide
variety of activities. For instance, the OCC has permitted national
banks to make equity investments in a corporation operating a point
of sale and ATM network;' in a corporation providing advice on the
government securities market;67 in a corporation affiliated with a cap-
tive insurer;" in a corporation providing services to participants in
government securities markets;6 9 and in a state chartered trust com-
pany.'
The second requirement is that the bank have the ability to limit
the venture to bank-permissible activities. In past letters, this re-
quirement has been addressed in a number of ways. For instance, in
partnerships, the partnership agreement can provide that the national
bank retain a veto over new activities. This is a common requirement
for partnerships.7
While minority shareholders in a corporation do not possess a
64. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1996).
65. See Letter of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency (Oct. 12, 1966)
(unpublished) (on file with author).
66. See Letter of Robert B. Serino, Deputy Chief Counsel OCC (Nov. 9, 1992)
(unpublished) (on file with author).
67. See Interpretive Letter No. 543, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,255 (Feb. 13,
1991).
68. See Interpretive Letter No. 554, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I 83,301 (May 7,
1990).
69. See Interpretive Letter No. 421, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,645 (Mar. 14,
1988).
70. See Letter from Stephen R. Steinbrink, Senior Deputy Comptroller OCC to
Charles A, Neale (Nov. 15, 1995).
71. See Interpretive Letter No. 625, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,507 (July 1,
1993).
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veto power as a matter of corporate law, there are other ways, princi-
pally by contract, of assuring that the entity does not engage in
impermissible activities. A common requirement is that the articles
of incorporation or bylaws limit the activities to those permissible for
national banks.' The OCC recently indicated that restricting activi-
ties through a shareholder's agreement could also satisfy this
requirement.
Banks normally satisfy the third requirement, that of limiting li-
ability, through using the corporate structure for their operating
subsidiaries. The corporate structure generally insulates the bank
from liability or loss beyond its investment in the shares of the sub-
sidiary.'
Further, as minority investments in operating subsidiaries are
generally unconsolidated subsidiaries of the Banks, the investment in
the operating subsidiary would be reported under the equity method
of accounting. This generally provides that losses in the subsidiary
are limited to the amount of the investment (including extensions of
credit or guarantees, if any, if shown on the investor's books). 4
The final requirement, that the investment must be convenient
or useful to the bank in carrying out its business, and not merely a
passive investment unrelated to that bank's banking business, re-
quires that a distinction be drawn between investments consistent
with the bank's business and plans, as opposed to investments made
because they are good investments. A presentation of the business
reasons driving the bank to carry out its businesses through the sub-
sidiary is required.
3. Bank Service Corporations as Joint Venture Participants
Banks have found that the bank service corporation may also be
a useful vehicle for participating in joint ventures with other bank
and non-bank parties. Under the statute, a bank service corporation
may only be owned by one or more insured depository institutions.
Even the participation of a non-banking subsidiary of a bank holding
company in the direct ownership of a bank service corporation will
destroy the character of the entity and may call into question the
ability of the bank to participate through its service corporation. Ac-
72. See Letters of Peter Liebesman, Assistant Director OCC, Legal Advisory Serv-
ices Division (Jan. 26, 1981 and Jan. 4, 1983) (unpublished) (on file with author).
73. See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 25 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1990).
74. See generally Accounting Principles Board, Op. 18, 1 19 (1971).
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cordingly, just as with the operating subsidiary, banks will structure
the service corporation as a wholly owned subsidiary, or as a subsidi-
ary owned solely by banks, and the operating subsidiary will then
participate as a venturer in the venture, either as a partner in a part-
nership, shareholder in a corporation, or in some other similar
capacity.
As noted above, there are three basic types of bank service cor-
porations; the "back office" corporation, performing check sorting,
posting and similar services for depository institutions, and for which
no approval is required; the "bank permissible" corporation, engag-
ing only in activities which the parent bank could engage, for which
the approval of the bank's primary federal regulator is required, and
the "4(c)(8)" corporation, engaging in BHCA permissible activities,
and for which the approval of the Federal Reserve is required. Al-
though the list of bank permissible and 4(c)(8) activities is virtually
identical, there are occasions when it is easier and more appropriate
to go to the Federal Reserve than the OCC, particularly when there
are a number of bank participants operating under a number of dif-
ferent charters, and the venture will operate on a broad geographic
basis.
Recently banks have used bank service corporations to engage in
merchant credit card processing, trust activities and mortgage bank-
ing activities.75
4. The Use of LLC's, Limited Partnerships and the Like
The LLC has become a useful entity for banks in structuring
joint ventures involving non-banking activities. A limited liability
company (LLC) is a creature of state law, combining some of the ad-
vantages of the partnership form (primarily with respect to flow
through tax treatment) with those of the corporate form (primarily
limited liability). The law of LLCs is relatively new. Not all states
have LLC statutes, and accordingly, there are still some unanswered
questions regarding LLCs. On the other hand, because of the combi-
nation of flow through tax treatment and limited liability, the
structure is uniquely suited to bank joint venture arrangements.
In general, a LLC has all of the flexibility of a partnership, in
that the participants may by contract allocate equity, responsibilities,
and governance issues. In order, however, to preserve both the part-
75. See Letter from Steven R. Steinbrink, Senior Deputy Comptroller OCC, to
Charles A. Neale (Nov. 15, 1995).
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nership tax treatment and the limited liability of a corporation, the
LLC may not possess most of the following characteristics: continuity
of life, centralized management, or free transferability of interests. 6
While these characteristics are easily avoided in theory, in practice
they may interfere with business expectations and objectives. For
example, dissolution by operation of law under specific circumstances
may interfere with the ability to obtain third party financing. Decen-
tralized management may interfere with the business necessity of
controlling decisions and eliminating meaningful participation by un-
qualified investors. Restricting transferability may interfere with the
business objective of those participants desiring liquidity.
A bank holding company may invest in a LLC under the same
terms and conditions as it may invest in a corporation. The OCC ap-
proved its first LLC investment for a bank in 1994, 7 and has since
approved several others.78 The criteria for investing in an LLC are: is
the activity permissible; can the bank limit the activities of the LLC
to those permissible for a bank or its operating subsidiaries; is liabil-
ity limited from an accounting and legal perspective; and is the
investment part of the banking business and not merely a passive in-
vestment. A recent Federal Reserve order relating to LLCs is the
Integrion order of December 1996, in which several banks were per-
mitted to acquire interests in this bank processing joint venture.
Banks often choose partnerships or limited partnerships for non-
banking activities, primarily due to the flow through nature of tax
treatment. The partnership is not taxed, but the tax attributes of the
entity are allocated among the partners in accordance with the part-
nership agreement.
While banks may not be general partners of a partnership,79 a
bank may establish a limited liability entity such as a corporation that
in turn may serve as the partner of a partnership.Yo A bank may serve
as a limited partner of a partnership, as liability for the debts and ob-
ligations of the partnership are limited. However, most banks choose
76. See Rev. Pro. 95-10, 1995-1 C.B. 501; see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2 (1996).
77. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 645, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,554
(Apr. 19, 1994).
78. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 669, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,617 (Oct.
14, 1994) (discussing mortgage banking activities); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 657, Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,605 (Mar. 31, 1995) (discussing REO activities); OCC Inter-
pretive Letter No. 689, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (Aug. 9, 1995) (discussing merchant
card processing).
79. See Merchants' Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295 (1906).
80. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 489, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (May 15,
1989).
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to establish a corporation as an operating subsidiary to serve as a
limited partner. Such an arrangement provides additional protection
against the liabilities or obligations of the partnership, and is of
slightly greater comfort to the regulators.
B. The Problem of the Impermissible Incidental Activity
In structuring acquisitions of non-banking activities, whether or
not a joint venture or other arrangement is used, there is the linger-
ing problem of the residual impermissible activity. If the activity is
conducted through a bank or bank subsidiary, the entity is only to
engage in activities in which it is permissible for the bank to engage.
If conducted through a non-bank subsidiary of the bank holding
company, the entity is only to engage in activities "so closely related
to the business of banking or managing or controlling banks as to be
a proper incident thereto." The list of permissible activities, while
broad, is not all inclusive. When acquisitions or investments are
made, particularly in the technology area, often there will be activi-
ties that are not permissible for the bank or bank holding company.
The general rule has been that impermissible activities should be
discontinued as soon as practicable, and in any event within two years
of the date of acquisition. Three recent rulings, one from the OCC
and two from the Federal Reserve, give some hope that there might
be some leeway to continue, at least in some modest fashion, certain
impermissible activities that are merely incidental to the major focus
of the business.
1. The OCC's Interpretive Letter Regarding MECA
In June 1995, the OCC approved requests by BankAmerica and
NationsBank to establish operating subsidiaries that in turn would
acquire MECA Software, the developer and marketer of a number of
computer software products, including the popular "Managing Your
Money" personal financial management program. MECA, using the
program as the basis for offering home banking services, had entered
into several licensing and distribution agreements with banks. The
banks proposed to acquire MECA, convert its ownership to a limited
liability company, and continue the activities of MECA related to the
home banking and financial management services.
The OCC in its approval analyzed the intent and purpose behind
its requirements relating to data processing and related services asso-
ciated with banking, financial, or other related economic data. The
OCC had little trouble with the home banking, financial manage-
ment, financial planning, investment analysis, tax estimation, and the
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other components of the software provided by MECA. Nor did the
OCC have a problem with the ancillary services related to the fore-
going, including providing checks and other financial forms. The
OCC pointed to a number of prior approvals relating to such serv-
ices. The OCC also noted that its prior ruling allowed a national
bank to use data processing equipment and technology to perform
for itself or others these financial services related to the business of
banking.
Of particular interest in the approval was a discussion of the
ability to market the software to individuals or entities that were not
financial institutions and were not customers of either of the acquir-
ing institutions. The OCC noted that as most of the software in
question was financially related, it could permissibly be marketed to
non-customers. With respect to non-financial products that might
have been or might be developed, the OCC viewed them as permissi-
ble "by-products" of the financial and banking products which the
banks were intimately involved in developing with MECA.
The request to the OCC asked for the ability to use MECA's ex-
cess capacity in equipment, personnel, and facilities for the
production and distribution of some software products that may be
non-financial in nature. The OCC noted that approximately 25% of
the total units, and 7% of the total revenue, were non-financial in na-
ture. The OCC indicated that this excess capacity would diminish
over time. The OCC determined that this was a permissible use of
the excess capacity, pointing to earlier letters allowing marketing of
records management systems manuals and supply and purchasing
manuals as part of permissible data processing activities, allowing the
acquisition of equipment with excess capacity, and allowing the resale
of excess long lines telecommunications capacity. The OCC analo-
gized the use and sale of the excess capacity to the ability of a
national bank to lease excess real property to other businesses.
Accordingly, while the OCC imposed the typical conditions
(articles limited to bank-permissible activities, the ability of the
banks to withdraw if the company engages in impermissible activities,
and no liability on the part of the banks for the debts, liabilities or
obligations of the company), the flexibility to actually engage in im-
permissible activities is not insubstantial.
Other OCC interpretive letters indicate perhaps an even greater
willingness to accommodate activities that might otherwise seem to
pose problems. In a letter dated August 19, 1996, the OCC indicated
that a national bank could act as an Internet service provider in con-
nection with its home banking service. The bank wished to offer
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home banking services to its customers and believed that it needed to
offer an Internet access option for that service. The OCC deter-
mined that the Internet access service was incidental to the home
banking service, and allowed the bank to provide such service to cus-
tomers and non-customers alike. The OCC has allowed a bank to
design and operate a toll booth on a toll road, determining that the
collection and transmission of funds was a part of the business of
banking, and in connection therewith the bank could design and con-
tract out the building of the toll booths and related devices.
2. The Federal Reserve's MECA and Paribas Orders
The Federal Reserve has long permitted bank holding compa-
nies to engage in data processing activities. In 1971, data processing
was added to the list of activities deemed to be closely related to
banking, and permitted the processing of banking, financial or related
economic data.8' The Board noted at the time that banks had histori-
cally performed certain types of billing and processing services for its
customers, and concluded that such billing and data processing serv-
ices were integrally related to the basic money transmission functions
traditionally performed by banks.
In 1982, the Board expanded its data processing regulation to
allow additional types of related activities. Bank holding companies
were allowed to engage in processing all financial, banking, or eco-
nomic information, thus permitting the processing of all types of
economic data without the requirement that the economic data be
related to other banking or financial data.' It was clear that the dele-
tion of the term "related" was intended to be significant.'
Regulation Y, containing the laundry list of permissible non-
banking activities, now permits the following data processing activi-
ties:
Providing to others data processing and data transmission serv-
ices, facilities (including data processing and data transmission
hardware, software, documentation or operating personnel), data
bases, or access to such services, facilities or data bases by any tech-
nological means, if:
(i) The data to be processed or furnished are financial, banking,
81. See Bank Holding Companies, 57 FED. RESERVE BULL. 512 (June 1971).
82. See 47 Fed. Reg. 37,368 (Aug. 26, 1982).
83. See Memorandum from Legal Division to the Board of Governors (Aug. 12,
1982); see also James McAfee, Citicorp., New York, New York, Order Approving Engag-
ing in Data Processing and Data Transmission Activities, 53 FED. RESERVE BULL. 505
(Aug. 1982).
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or economic, and the services are provided pursuant to a written
agreement so describing and limiting the services;
(ii) The facilities are designed, marketed, and operated for the
processing and transmission of financial, banking, or economic data;
and
(iii) The hardware provided in connection therewith is offered
only in conjunction with software designed and marketed for the
processing and transmission of financial, banking, or economic data,
and where the general purpose hardware does not constitute more
than 10% of the cost of any packaged offering.
In approving applications under 4(c)(8) over the years, the Fed-
eral Reserve had consistently limited the ability of the bank holding
company to engage in impermissible activities not falling within the
ambit of the regulation. To the extent that a target engaged in im-
permissible activities, those activities would be phased out as quickly
as possible." Under no circumstances would the company be permit-
ted to engage in the impermissible activities for an extended period
of time."
While the two recent Federal Reserve orders do not provide un-
limited authority for bank holding companies to engage in
impermissible activities through these otherwise permissible invest-
ments, the flexibility granted is significant and important.
a. The MECA Order
On February 6, 1996, the Federal Reserve permitted The Royal
Bank of Canada to acquire 20% of the voting stock of MECA Soft-
ware, L.L.C. Royal Bank applied to join BankAmerica,
NationsBank, Fleet, and First Bank Systems as owners of MECA.
Each of the other banks owned their respective shares of MECA
through bank operating subsidiaries; Royal Bank, as a foreign bank,
needed the Federal Reserve's approval under Regulation Y.
The MECA "Managing Your Money" software and related
services easily fall within the parameters of Regulation Y. It is a
computer program that allows customers to conduct basic banking
functions and personal financial management using personal comput-
ers. The software, and related financial software, is marketed both to
84. See Fed. Reserve Reg. Serv. 4-472 (Aug. 1995), available in WL FRRS 4-472
(noting that the Board only allowed a bank holding company to offer home shopping,
travel and news information as part of a limited pilot research program to test home
banking services).
85. See William W. Wiles, Citicorp., New York, New York Order Approving Acquis-
tion of Quotron Systems, Inc., 72 FED. RESERvE BULL. 487 (July 1986).
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consumers and financial institutions, to allow the institutions to offer
such services to their customers. From the Federal Reserve's point of
view, there was no problem associated with the acquisition of at least
that portion of MECA that was engaging in the financial software
programs.
Importantly, MECA had also developed and markets various
non-financial software, including games, a computer security pro-
gram, a medical reference library, and a program providing basic
legal forms. These activities do not fall within the Regulation Y limi-
tations. The Board, however, permitted MECA to keep, and indeed
continue, these activities. MECA and the Bank indicated that the
revenues from the impermissible activities were small, amounting to
approximately 7% of 1994 revenues, that MECA had no intention of
developing new non-financial software or to upgrade, enhance or
promote its current non-financial programs, and that the non-
financial portion of the company's business was expected to diminish
over time. Based on the limited nature of the activity, the Board ap-
proved the acquisition and did not require the cessation or divestiture
of the impermissible activities.
b. The Paribas Order
On February 26, the Board approved an application of Compag-
nie Financiere de Paribas to engage de novo in providing an
integrated software program to operators of digital mobile telephone
networks to perform billing and account-related services for cus-
tomer accounts. The software calculates bills based on data provided
by the telephone operator, such as date, time, duration, and destina-
tion of the call, the customer's service contract, and individual
account balances. The company also provides general accounting
services, such as recording payments and balances, provides billing
and settlement services, and generates various related reports to the
operator.
Part of the services performed consist of customer identification
and account information and the generation of certain reports used
by the operator to detect fraud. While these functions would be per-
formed only in connection with the data processing and billing
services, they are not within the list of "banking, financial or eco-
nomic" information described in Regulation Y. The Board, however,
allowed the company to engage in these activities, describing them as
a "relatively small part" of the operation of the company,
"incidental" to the primary billing and account functions to be pro-
vided to the telephone operator.
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Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, Paribas owns a majority
of France Telecom, the French national telephone operating com-
pany, and owns 49.9% of Financiere Sema, a French investment
company that in turn owns 41.6% of Sema Group plc, which devel-
oped the software. It was not stated whether Sema offered the
product overseas. Sema proposed to establish the company as a
wholly-owned U.S.-based subsidiary to sell the software described in
the proposal.
c. Other Considerations
The two orders are extremely significant. The limited authority
to retain or engage in some modest non-financial activities provides
important "real world" opportunities for financial institutions to par-
ticipate more directly in the technological revolution that will surely
transform banking over the coming years. The apparent rationales
for the approvals may be instructive.
In part, the Board's acquiescence in the MECA order may have
been driven by the OCCs approvals of the acquisition of MECA by
BankAmerica and NationsBank. The OCC permitted the acquisition
without requiring cessation of the non-financial activities. The OCC
stated that the non-financial software activities, amounting to ap-
proximately 25% of total units sold and 7% of revenues was a
permissible use of what it termed "excess capacity," consistent with
prior OCC interpretive letters and rulings.
The interplay between the Federal Reserve's treatment of the
impermissible activities and the OCC's treatment is interesting. The
OCC viewed the non-financial activities as minimal by-products of
the permissible financial activities, and imposed no obligation to
cease the activities. Factors cited in the OCC letter gave support to
the conclusion that these merely incidental activities posed no prob-
lem. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve relied upon statements
that there was no intent to develop new nonfinancial programs or to
upgrade or enhance these programs. Accordingly, the Federal Re-
serve's view that they would simply die out over time supported a
decision not to require immediate divestiture or cessation of the ac-
tivities.
More importantly, however, the acquiescence may have been
driven by a need to assure that banking organizations are not unnec-
essarily prevented from becoming active participants in the
technological developments that will likely radically change banking
over the next several years. Non-bank providers of services, such as
Microsoft, Intuit, and others, have targeted the banking market as
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prime territory for expansion. Such enterprises may have greater ac-
cess to talent, greater ability to experiment, and greater aptitude in
finding successful approaches for delivering banking services to con-
sumers than the banks themselves. If banks are precluded from
taking advantage of the expertise in the computer industry, they may
well find themselves also-rans in the financial services industry of the
future.
With Paribas, the Board may have had some sympathy for Par-
ibas' extensive involvement in the telecommunications industry
through its ownership of France Telecom. While no U.S.-based
banking organization would be permitted a similar ownership posi-
tion in AT&T, for instance, Paribas had substantial experience with
the industry, and had developed, through its subsidiaries, useful
products and services which it sought to use in the United States.
More significantly, however, the Paribas order demonstrates the
difficulties in drawing bright lines in the data processing/computer
area. Having to force all activities squarely within the tests of
"banking, financial, or economic" requires the elimination of activi-
ties that are natural outgrowths of such services. By eliminating
these natural outgrowths, however, the ability to provide the permis-
sible services is endangered. It is not entirely clear from the order,
but it would appear that Paribas' ability to successfully offer its pack-
age of billing and accounting services is enhanced by its ability to
offer the services facilitating the detection of fraud. A non-bank
competitor would have no such constraints, and if the services were
at all useful or beneficial, the non-bank competitor would eventually
capture the business. The flexibility to offer otherwise impermissible
services as an adjunct to permissible services is critical in many in-
stances to the ability to compete in the marketplace.
Of course most of this would be solved if the Federal Reserve
adopts is proposed revision to Regulation Y. The 30% basket for
otherwise impermissible processing activities provides greater flexi-
bility than is evidenced in either the MECA or Paribas orders.
C. Minority Equity Investments
Often banking organizations wish to make small investments in
companies, either as a prelude to a subsequent potential acquisition,
or simply because of the belief that the investment may be worth-
while.
Investing in equity securities through the bank is difficult. Na-
tional banks in general are precluded from owning common or
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preferred stock for investment purposes,' and state banks may not
make any minority equity investment impermissible for national
banks.' There are two avenues for minority equity investments,
however, that may be available: the minority investment through a
bank holding company, and minority investments through SBICs.
1. The Minority Investment Under the BHCA
The BHCA allows a bank holding company to acquire shares of
a company without approval of the Board so long as the ownership
interest is less than 5% of the voting shares of the company." This
leeway investment authority allows a bank holding company to make
minority equity investments in companies."
The Federal Reserve does not want to allow these minority in-
vestments to become a substitute for more active or controlling
investments, and accordingly has placed two important glosses on the
statutory language. First, the minority investment must be passive,
and may not be used in a way that allows the investing bank holding
company to participate actively in the business. When a group of
twenty bank holding companies each proposed to invest in five per-
cent of the outstanding voting shares of an insurance entity with the
intent of participating in certain underwriting and related activities,
the Board determined that the 4(c)(6) exemption was not available.
It went on to state that the exemption was only available for passive
investments.9
Second, the investment, regardless of how structured, cannot
give the investor effective control over the company or permit it to
exercise a controlling interest over the management or policies of the
company. Various bank holding companies have attempted to ex-
pand the limits of permissible investments under the BHCA, and
have attempted to stretch the less than 5% voting share exemption to
its fullest (and beyond).
One common structure was to combine the less than 5% voting
interests with large non-voting interests, contractual provisions
86. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994).
87. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994).
88. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994).
89. See Jennifer Johnson, NationsBank Corp., Charlotte, North Carolina, Order Ap-
proving Application to Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activites, 80 FED. RESERVE BULL.
154 (Feb. 1994) (involving debt financing combined with warrants to acquire 24.9% of the
borrower's voting shares).
90. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.137(d)(2) (1995); see also Board Letter, Jan. 22, 1986; Fed.
Reserve Reg. Serv. 4-600.1 (Mar. 1994), available in WL FRRS 4-600.1.
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granting control or options, warrants or other interests that provided
strong assurances of compliance with the will of the investor. The
Board has indicated that many of these provisions can create effec-
tive control or, at the least, may amount to impermissible controlling
influence over management and policies.91
The earliest statements from the Board related to non-voting
equity investments by bank holding companies in other banks or
bank holding companies. Often described as "stake out" invest-
ments, these investments were intended to give the investing bank
holding company an effective leg up on subsequent acquisitions when
interstate banking became legal and the acquisition could finally be
consummated. In a policy statement issued in 1982, the Board stated
that a less than 5% voting interest, when combined with an invest-
ment in non-voting securities of less than 25% of the total equity,
could be consistent with the BHCA. However, the Board warned
that restrictions on the ability of the acquiree to sell or transfer
shares or assets of its subsidiaries or otherwise restrict the rights of
the owners of the shares of the acquiree could result in impermissible
control. The Board indicated that various covenants or contractual
provisions could not impermissibly limit the existing management's
control over operations, policies or business decisions. The Board
also indicated that contractual provisions that substantially hindered
the acquisition of the target by a third party would be disfavored.92
Other items that the Board has indicated may be impermissible
include:
the acquisition of shares which are non-voting only in the hands
of the bank holding company, and which become voting when trans-
ferred to a third party. The Board indicated that the ability to
control the transfer of voting shares may constitute control over
those shares; contractual provisions limiting discretion with respect to
normal management decisions, such as sale of assets, dividends,
mergers or acquisitions, or the like. Similarly, entering into a merger
agreement with an unusually long period for consummation, without
providing a mechanism for the target to terminate the agreement is
problematic; agreements giving control over the selection of direc-
tors, the voting of shares or other corporate matters, or requiring that
91. See Board Letter, July 8, 1982; see also Michael S. Heifer & Russell J. Bruemmer,
Interstate Nonvoting Equity Agreements and "Control" Under the Bank Holding Company
Act: The Impact of the Federal Reserve Board's 1982 Statement, 39 Bus. LAW 383 (1984);
12 C.F.R. § 225.143 (1995); Statement of Policy on Nonbanking Equity Investments by
Bank Holding Companies, 68 FED. RESERVE BULL. 413 (July 1982).
92. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.143; 68 FED. RES. BULL. 413 (1982).
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the target consult with the investor prior to taking certain significant
actions.
On the other hand, the Board has indicated that if the total eq-
uity investment remains below 25%, if any shares must be sold in a
public offering of wide distribution, and if the target can terminate
the agreement on reasonable terms and conditions, the arrangement
is more likely to be acceptable. The Board indicated that each such
arrangement must be evaluated individually, and requested that par-
ties contemplating such arrangements should first consult with the
Board.
The ability to use the minority investment provisions of the
BHCA while following the Federal Reserve's guidelines for nonvot-
ing equity investments provides significant advantages in certain
situations. While the bank holding company cannot take too active a
role in the business, the ability to make an investment and participate
in its growth can be very useful. Not only are relationships gener-
ated, but useful information may be obtained. Opportunities for
business synergies may result.93
2. The Use of SBIC's for Minority Investments
A small business investment company is a permissible invest-
ment for a national bank under section 24(seventh) of title 12 of the
United States Code. A national bank may invest up to five percent
of its capital and surplus in a SBIC.9 As the BHCA permits bank
holding companies to acquire, without approval, shares of the kinds,
and in the amounts, eligible for investment by national banks, the
Federal Reserve allows such investments as well. The Federal Re-
serve does limit the amount of investment by a bank holding
company to approximate that which a national bank could invest.95
D. Percentage Leases, Dual Employees, Sales of Customer Lists and
Similar Devices
In many instances, banking and non-banking parties may wish to
enter into a cooperative venture that allows the non-bank provider to
take advantage of products, expertise, and technology, while allowing
the bank to lend credibility and customer access. Each organization
93. See Board Letter of Nov. 25, 1986, (noting that the Board approved, subject to
conditions, Sumitomo's acquisition of a 24.9% nonvoting interest in Goldman Sachs, sub-
ject to numerous restrictions on common activities).
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1996).
95. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.111 (1996).
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will certainly wish to be compensated for what it brings to the table.
However, neither party may wish to commit significant dollars or
manpower to a more formalized venture. Limited relationships, such
as percentage leases, shared employees, referral arrangements or
joint marketing arrangements may allow a more limited commitment
while still permitting each organization to benefit financially.
1. The Percentage Lease
Banks are generally able to rent lobby space to non-bank pro-
viders of services, either on a flat fee basis or a percentage rent basis.
This arrangement allows a bank to provide, through a third party,
additional products and services to its customers on its premises, and
to benefit financially through the arrangement. It may solidify cus-
tomer relationships, allow the more productive use of retail floor
space, and provide an additional source of fee income.
The leasing arrangements are useful in areas where the invest-
ment to create a fully competitive product is too high for the banking
organization, where regulatory constraints prohibit or impede the
offering of the product directly, or where a third party provider has
significant marketplace advantages over the bank. Accordingly,
leasing arrangements have been used with securities, insurance,
travel agencies and various other businesses.
The OCC approved percentage lease arrangements in December
1983, noting that leasing excess space "was merely an incident to the
banking business," and stating that the bank should be able to spread
expenses and operating costs by renting excess space to a variety of
tenants without restriction. The OCC recognized that it was possible
to structure a lease arrangement so that the bank might be construed
as entering into a joint venture or partnership with the non-bank pro-
vider, which would raise other issues and could even be
impermissible. Such concerns could arise if the lease rate were un-
usually high or the terms and conditions of the lease gave the bank
effective control over the operations of the lessee. Accordingly, the
OCC indicated that national banks should contract on terms and
conditions customary in the field of commercial leasing. The OCC
also indicated that certain terms ought to be incorporated in the ar-
rangement, including:
language specifically negating the creation of a joint venture or
partnership; language expressly stating that the bank would not be
liable for the debts or liabilities of the lessee; separate identification
of the non-banking company, with disclosures to avoid customer con-
fusion; appropriate advertising, indicating the separate and
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independent ownership and operation of the business; and an arm's
length lessor-lessee relationship. 6
Based on the OCC guidance, the OCC has permitted lease ar-
rangements with insurance agencies, securities brokers, and
investment advisors, and indeed has stated that a national bank may
enter into a percentage lease with any business.' Accordingly, a
bank may enter into an arrangement with essentially any retail or-
ganization in order to expand the products and services offered to its
customers.
Somewhat ironically, banks are entering into lease arrangements
with other businesses as lessees, in order to gain access to the cus-
tomers of other businesses. The most prevalent example is the
grocery store branch, where the bank will typically lease a modest
amount of space and establish a branch operation. The in-store
branch operates not only as a convenience for existing bank custom-
ers, it provides a meaningful opportunity to attract new customers.
Essentially the same principles that permit a bank to sub-lease space
to non-bank businesses also permit a bank to lease space from non-
bank businesses.
2. Dual Employees
Banks have expanded on the lease arrangement by coupling the
lease with provisions where the bank and non-bank entity share em-
ployees. These employees may be either back office employees,
involved in clerical or administrative functions, or they may be sales
agents or representatives offering the products and services to cus-
tomers.8
The dual employee relationships raise a series of concerns re-
garding separateness of the businesses of the lessee and the bank.
Written contracts, specifically stating duties, responsibilities, control,
and compensation are required. The bank should have no duty or
obligation to monitor or control the employees while engaging in
their duties on behalf of the lessee. None of the bank's other em-
ployees should be providing services to the lessee. If the employee is
to engage in activities on the bank's premises, the activities must be
96. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 274, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,438
(Dec. 2, 1983).
97. See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-8 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,037
(Nov. 17, 1987) (subject, of course, to safety and soundness considerations).
98. See OCC Interpretive Letter from Richard Fitzgerald, OCC Chief Counsel, to
Thomas Russo (June 4, 1985), available in 1985 WL 187368(OCC) (hereinafter INVEST
letter).
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limited to those that would be permissible for the national bank.
However, it should be noted that the OCC has also stated that a na-
tional bank employee can also act as agent for another entity, even if
the activity is impermissible, so long as the bank receives no share of
the profits resulting from the employee's activities on behalf of an-
other, and the activity does not constitute an unsafe and unsound
banking practice."
The other federal banking agencies have taken positions with re-
spect to leases and employee sharing that are fairly consistent with
the OCC statements. The FDIC has cautioned regarding the need
for adequate contractual limitations on liability to avoid concerns re-
garding the bank's exposure to the activity.
States have expressed concern about leasing and employee
sharing, particularly in the insurance area. A number of states have
anti-affiliation statutes, prohibiting in various forms the combination
of banking and insurance agency activities. Certain of these states
have viewed the leasing and employee sharing arrangements as at-
tempts to circumvent the anti-affiliation laws, and have issued fairly
extensive guidelines on permissible arrangements in the insurance
area.
3. Sales of Customer Lists or Referral Fees
Although a bank may be precluded from engaging in an activity
directly, banks have historically been able to act as a finder or refer-
ral source for a fee, and have been able to sell customer lists and
other information. Such arrangements can allow access to the cus-
tomer base in exchange for additional fee income, providing
advantages to the bank without any capital investment.
The OCC has stated that a national bank may act as a finder for
companies offering financial and non-financial products or services.
While the bank must limit its activities to those of a "finder," and
may not become involved in negotiating the actual sale of the product
or service, it does allow the bank to participate to some degree in an
activity that may be otherwise off limits.
Banks have used the authority to act as finder in merger and ac-
quisition transactions, real estate transactions, and other service
functions. The OCC permitted a national bank to act as a finder in
informing its customers of automobile club memberships, assisting
99. See Letter from Ford Barrett, OCC Assistant Chief Counsel, to Max Reper-
meiner (July 23, 1982).
100. See OCC Interpretive Ruling No. 7.7200 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.7200 (1996)).
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them in filling out applications, and otherwise facilitating the match-
ing of the bank's customers with the automobile club. 10'
Banks can sell or lease their customer lists to non-bank provid-
ers, who in turn will solicit the bank's customers, typically by mail or
by telephone. The OCC allows such activities so long as there are no
tie-in arrangements with the non-bank provider. The OCC is con-
cerned that customers will believe that they might be forced to
acquire the non-bank product or service as a condition to obtaining
some service from the bank or in exchange for more favorable treat-
ment from the bank.
Similar to the sale of the customer list, banks are permitted to
include promotional materials from non-bank providers in the banks'
mailings to their customers. These "statement stuffers" allow the
bank to capitalize on its customer relationships, hopefully in an ap-
propriate manner. Banks, of course, will want to review and approve
the materials sent, and will be rightfully concerned regarding the na-
ture of the product or service offered. The bank may be
compensated either on a flat fee basis or on some basis relative to the
success of the solicitation."°
E. Considerations Involving Contracting
Obviously, one mechanism for entering into a relationship with a
third party is simply a contractual arrangement. Examining all of the
issues associated with bank contracting is beyond the scope of this
outline, but clearly many of the alliances and relationships being es-
tablished today among banking and non-banking enterprises are the
purely contractual relationships. Whether they are the now relatively
common contracts with Intuit to provide a linkage to the home
banking services, or the major outsourcing contracts with major en-
terprises such as EDS, IBM, or Unisys, these contracts involve a
series of significant issues and strategic and business decisions.
Some of the advantages of the contractual arrangements are ob-
vious. There can be substantial cost savings, both with the
management of the service to the development costs associated with
future requirements. Through the contractual arrangement, the bank
may be able to access substantially greater expertise, technology, or
service levels. Many of these third parties have devoted resources to
101. See OCC No-Objection Letter No. 89-02 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) [ 83,014
(Apr. 17, 1989).
102. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 339 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,509 (May
16, 1985).
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particular products or services that a banking organization cannot
hope to match, and were it to attempt to do so, could never generate
savings or revenues justifying such an investment.
On the other hand, one of the most serious issues relates to con-
trol over the product, the service, or the delivery mechanism. For
example, with the Intuit/Quicken arrangements, control over the cus-
tomer is of paramount concern to many participants. Is a customer
using the Intuit product the customer of the bank or the customer of
Intuit? Is that customer more easily lost to another institution? Is
there a real relationship with the bank that the bank can capitalize
upon?
In the major outsourcing arrangements, a long term dependence
on a vendor is created. The bank will have lost, in most instances,
equipment, personnel, and control. The fate of the vendor may be-
come the fate of the bank.
There are certain statutory and regulatory provisions to keep in
mind in the contracting area.
Contractual arrangements entered into by a bank and a third
party may create regulatory oversight. The Bank Service Corpora-
tion Act has a relatively peculiar provision stating as follows:
[W]henever a bank that is regularly examined by an appro-
priate Federal banking agency, or any subsidiary or affiliate
of such bank that is subject to examination by that agency,
causes to be performed for itself, by contract or otherwise,
any services authorized under this chapter, whether on or
off its premises-
(1) such performance shall be subject to regulation and ex-
amination by such agency to the same extent as if such
services were being performed by the bank itself on its own
premises, and
(2) the bank shall notify such agency of the existence of the
service relationship within thirty days after the making of
such service contract or the performance of the service,
whichever comes first. 3
Not all contracts with non-bank providers are subject to this
provision; however, to the extent that a bank has contracted out its
back office processing, customer service operations, or other banking
functions to a third party, the bank regulators will want to have the
right to examine the activities to assure that they are being conducted
properly and appropriately.
103. See 12 U.S.C. § 1867(c) (1994).
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In an Interpretive Letter, the OCC stated that the right under
the Bank Service Corporation Act to oversee these nonbank provid-
ers of services is "probably narrower" than the authority to examine
a bank and its subsidiaries. It went on to state that it was probably
only the "performance" of the services that would be subject to ex-
amination and regulation.''
Finally, the FDIC has the right, under FDICIA, to address con-
tracts. Under Section 30 of the FDI Act, a bank may not enter into a
written or oral contract with any person to provide goods, products,
or services to or for the benefit of such bank "if the performance of
the contract would adversely affect the safety and soundness of the
institution."'' 5 The FDIC is given the authority to promulgate regula-
tions implementing the prohibition of the statute. Although
regulations were proposed, the FDIC had a difficult time defining the
types of contracts that fell within the prohibition. While the regula-
tion was withdrawn, apparently because "the existence of adverse
contracts has decreased considerably since the proposed rule was is-
sued for comment, and because of overwhelmingly negative
comments received,"'' 6 the lingering power of the FDIC to address
these adverse contracts by order must be respected.
III. CASE STUDY-MERCHANT PROCESSING
The recent developments in merchant processing highlight pres-
sures facing banking organizations in addressing particular lines of
business where technology is rapidly changing the nature of the busi-
ness. The varied responses of banking organizations gives a feel as to
the flexibility of the bank regulatory structure to accommodate dif-
fering business and strategic objectives.
The merchant processing business involves a series of activities
undertaken in connection with the sale of goods or services by a mer-
chant though the use of a credit or debit card. The activities include
card authorizations at the time of purchase; acquiring and processing
card transactions; settlement of card transactions; and depositing
funds in merchant accounts. The transactions and arrangement are
subject to a number of protections and safeguards appropriate for
and consistent with the nature of the business and the risks involved.
104. See OCC Interpretive Letter dated July 26, 1989, available in 1989 WL
300421(OCC) (addressing the scope of the OCC's oversight with respect to CHIPS (the
Clearing House Interbank Payments System) and SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Finan-
cial Telecommunications)).
105. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831g (1994).
106. See 60 Fed. Reg. 24303 (1995).
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As an initial matter, it is clear from past precedent that merchant
processing activities are permissible for national banks, whether con-
ducted directly or through operating subsidiaries. 7  Similarly,
merchant processing activities are permissible for bank holding com-
panies and their non-bank subsidiaries under Regulation Y. 09
Accordingly, banking organizations have the flexibility to place their
merchant processing activities virtually anywhere in their corporate
structures.
The merchant processing business is intensely competitive and
national in scope. The nature of the business requires a substantial
investment in technology necessary to reduce costs, provide the level
of service required, and to maintain profitability. Because of the high
investment in technology, there are significant economies associated
with size; that is, with a larger transaction base, the costs of technol-
ogy can be spread over many customers, yielding lower transaction
costs and associated competitive advantages. Over recent years,
much of the competition in the merchant processing business has
come from non-banking competitors that have made the investment
in technology needed to compete effectively in the business.
While banks are major participants in the merchant processing
business, they are not the largest. Indeed, the largest participants in
the merchant card business are not banks; the major processors for
bank cards"0 9 include NaBANCO/First Data Systems/Card Estab-
lishment Services, First USA and National Data Corporation. For all
cards, major competitors include NaBANCO/First Data Sys-
tems/Card Establishment Services, American Express, Discover, GE
Capital, Sears and National Data. Major bank players include Bank
of America and First Bank System.
Many banks have exited the business over the past several years.
Numerous banks have sold their merchant processing business out-
right to non-bank participants in the marketplace, including Citibank,
Signet, Marine Midland Bank, Chemical Bank, AmSouth, Chase
Manhattan Bank, Security Pacific and First National Bank of Mary-
land." Numerous other banks have sold their merchant processing
107. See OCC Banking Bulletin 92-24, Merchant Processing (May 5, 1992); Comp-
troller's Handbook for National Bank Examiners, Section 212.1, "Credit Card Plans"; see
also OCC Interpretive Letter No. 689, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81,004 (Aug. 9,
1995).
108. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.25(b)(1) (1996).
109. Such as VISA and MasterCard
110. See AM. BANKER, Sept. 15, 1989, at 2; AM. BANKER, Mar. 13, 1990, at 2; AM.
BANKER, Nov. 13, 1991, at 3; AM. BANKER, Mar. 11, 1992, at 1.
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business outright to other banks with larger businesses, including
Central Fidelity (to Michigan National), Deposit Guaranty (to Soci-
ety) and Shawmut (to CoreStates).
Other banks have determined to enter into strategic alliances
with non-bank providers. Card Establishment Services, Inc. (CES), a
subsidiary of First Data Systems, has entered into arrangements with
Barnett Banks, Inc., U.S. Bancorp, Norwest Corporation, BancOne
Corporation and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to provide merchant serv-
ices. These arrangements have been structured in various ways by
the banks and their non-bank partners. For instance, the United
States National Bank of Oregon, the lead bank subsidiary of U.S.
Bancorp, established an operating subsidiary that would in turn own,
with CES, shares of a limited liability company.' The subsidiary
banks of Barnett Banks, Inc. provided a notice under the Bank Serv-
ice Corporation Act, to establish bank service corporation
subsidiaries of the banks that in turn would engage in a joint venture
with First Data and CES to engage in the merchant processing activi-
ties."' These arrangements have involved contributions of processing
to the venture, with a territorial "franchise" for soliciting and devel-
oping new business.
First Union recently contributed its merchant processing busi-
ness to NOVA Information Systems, Inc. (NOVA), the nation's
twelfth largest merchant processor, in exchange for a substantial eq-
uity stake. The transaction was structured so that each First Union
bank established a wholly-owned operating subsidiary that received
the merchant processing business of its parent. The operating sub-
sidiary in turn contributed the business to a new holding company in
exchange for an equity ownership. This equity ownership repre-
sented approximately 40% of the resulting equity of NOVA. NOVA
intended to undertake a public offering of its shares, which would
further reduce the First Union ownership to slightly over 30% of the
entity. The OCC approved the investment in early 1996,"' and
NOVA completed its initial public offering in May, 1996. The trans-
action provided an alternative for First Union to realize the inherent
value associated with its merchant processing business while still
maintaining a substantial stake in the future appreciation and growth
111. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 689, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,004
(Aug. 9, 1995).
112. See Letter from Michael W. Briggs to Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (July 21,
1995).
113. See OCC Interpretive Letter to Robert Andersen No. 720, Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,035 (Jan. 26, 1996).
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of the business. First Union announced that its unrealized gain as a
result of the NOVA transaction is approximately $280 million.
Finally, Synovus Financial Corporation, a bank holding com-
pany, through its subsidiary Total Systems, is forming a joint venture
with VISA to offer merchant processing services to compete with
First Data/CES. Synovus is applying under Section 4(c)(8) to form a
new subsidiary that in turn will become a 50% participant with VISA
in a new limited liability company114
The differing structural responses to a common problem, that of
addressing the business and technological requirements of the mer-
chant card business, illustrate the flexibility of the regulatory
framework to accommodate a number of different answers. Major
banking organizations have opted for strategies ranging from sale to
acquisition, and have structured joint ventures with non-bank provid-
ers within the bank, as a bank operating subsidiary, as a bank service
corporation, and as a bank holding company subsidiary. There is no
"best" solution for every organization; rather, there are a variety of
solutions from which to choose in meeting the needs of each particu-
lar organization.
114. See Application to Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Feb. 26, 1996).
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